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WILL THE CREDIT CRUNCH
LEAD TO RECESSION?
Management gurus and the publishing
industry that sustains them often
congratulate themselves on their
‘thought leadership’, compiling endless
lists of ‘ultimate business thinkers’ and
‘most enduring ideas’. All very amusing
– indeed, frequently lampooned by
columnists like Lucy Kellaway in the
Financial Times – but disturbing too.
Despite the lack of intellectual 
rigour in most business bestsellers 
and an absence of any evidence beyond
the anecdotal, they clearly have a 
ready market.
Economists and other serious social
scientists tend to be more modest in
the claims they make for their ideas –
and they are typically more reluctant to
package their findings in a way that
will attract an audience beyond
academia. The Centre for Economic
Performance (CEP) has always sought to
buck this trend: one of its central aims
is for top-quality economic research to
have an impact on society through the
long-term percolation of new ideas
into policy, practice and public
understanding.
In this issue of CentrePiece, we take
a leaf out of the management crowd’s
book with the launch of a series of
reviews of CEP’s achievements, looking
back at some of the ‘big ideas’ that
have emerged from the research and 
their influence on both scholarship 
and public policy. In the first article, 
John Van Reenen describes how the
Centre’s work on unemployment 
and welfare have not only changed the
way economists think about these
problems, but also led to policies like
the New Deals.
CEP research of a more recent
vintage is making significant advances
in the study of management itself, and
here we report findings from our
surveys of management practices in
China and India. Two other articles
address key issues for these emerging
giants of the world economy – and
much more will be discussed at a 
three-day conference on the topic that
CEP is hosting in early July.
Elsewhere, we examine the often
perverse effects of regulation in Britain
– the lethal impact of pay regulation in
healthcare; and how planning
regulations stop us building houses
where they’re most needed – and the
role of incentives – for the unemployed
to get a job; and for novice monetary
policy-makers to conceal their true
views on interest rates.
Finally, our cover story asks whether
the credit crunch will lead to recession
and reaches a worrying conclusion. 
This too draws on enduring ideas 
from economic research: the doctoral
thesis of Federal Reserve chairman 
Ben Bernanke. When it comes to
management of the world economy,
economists and their ideas are,
fortunately, more prominent than 
the business gurus.
Romesh Vaitilingam
Editor
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W
hat has economics
done for me lately? 
I am often asked
about the purpose 
of the Centre for
Economic Performance (CEP). What 
impact have we had? How can we justify
our funding?
The CEP makes a difference in a variety
of ways. We evaluate public policies to see if
they have any benefits and, if so, to whom
those benefits accrue and whether they
outweigh any costs. The literacy hour in
primary schools, the Job Seeker’s Allowance
for the unemployed, R&D tax credits and
many other policies have been subjected 
to our rigorous and objective assessment.
Our findings can be used by governments
and others to assess what worked in the
past and what needs to be changed in 
the future.
Of course, many of these findings go
unattributed once they enter the national
bloodstream. Ideas, once accepted, are
often bastards. How many people know
that the decline in social mobility between
the generations born in 1958 and 1970,
mentioned repeatedly by politicians and
commentators, was first discovered by 
CEP researchers?
CEP researchers do not hide away from
public debate. In 2007 alone, CEP research
appeared in the print, online or broadcast
media on more than 380 occasions. It is by
taking public communication seriously that
our research can be disseminated to a
wider audience.
Our researchers are also formally
involved in policy-making in a number of
different areas, serving on bodies such as
the Low Pay Commission, the Monetary
Policy Committee, the Migration Advisory
Service and pay review bodies, and
advising business and non-governmental
organisations such as trade unions.
But this perhaps misses out what is
most important: the long-term impact of
the CEP. Starting in this issue of
CentrePiece, we have decided to give a
flavour of how our ideas have influenced
the world. As Keynes said in The General
Theory, ‘Madmen in authority, who hear
voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy
from some academic scribbler of a few
years back.’ Whatever your opinion of their
mental state, there is no question that
policy-makers have been significantly
influenced by CEP research.
Obviously our ideas are not developed
in a vacuum: we have many interactions
with the wider research and policy
community, above all with others in the
economics faculty at the London School of
Economics (LSE). We are fortunate to be
part of the department that is the 
highest-ranked in the world outside the
United States. 
We have learned that it takes time for
academic ideas to percolate into public
consciousness. Our findings and their
policy implications are not accepted
immediately – or sometimes at all. Many
are disproved by events or further
investigation, but even the ones that prove
to be right take time to be supported and
put into practice. This means, of course,
that many of the new ideas that we have
been generating in recent years may not
have an effect for many years to come.
Our first ‘big ideas’ overview looks at
unemployment and welfare to work.
Future commentaries will include the
causes of rising wage inequality and
policies to combat this inequality such 
as education, the minimum wage and
unions; declining social mobility;
productivity and competition; innovation
policies; economic geography; and
happiness and mental health.
Unemployment and 
welfare to work
Unemployment and welfare to work have
been one of the most high profile areas in
which the combination of theory and
careful empirical analysis at CEP led to
policy developments. In turn, the
recommendations that were adopted 
were evaluated and this allowed us to 
enhance our theoretical understanding of
these issues.
In the aftermath of the Great
Depression and World War II, the
Keynesian consensus was that
unemployment was essentially a problem
To illustrate CEP’s impact on public policy and debate,
John Van Reenen introduces and presents the first in a
series of ‘big ideas’, surveying the significant research
findings that have emerged from the Centre over the past
three decades.
Big id
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of demand. Governments needed to get
the level of aggregate demand right to
maintain full employment through a
mixture of monetary and, above all, fiscal
policies. LSE economists like John Hicks
and Bill Phillips (of the famous Phillips
curve) were at the heart of this consensus.
The appearance of ‘stagflation’ –
growing inflation and unemployment – 
in the 1970s shattered this happy 
state of affairs. Out of the crisis,
Thatcherism drew on Milton Friedman’s
work to emphasise the failure of 
demand management and the need for
governments to allow the market to let
unemployment find its ‘natural’ level (the
NAIRU or ‘non-accelerating inflation rate of
unemployment’). Printing money to boost
demand led only to accelerating inflation.
In 1990, as the Thatcher era was
drawing to a close, CEP was born. A major
strand of our work (building on the former
Centre for Labour Economics) agreed that
there was a NAIRU as Friedman argued.
But rather than being something
immutable and fixed in stone,
microeconomic supply-side policies could
be used to lower the NAIRU and thereby
reduce unemployment. Simply cutting
unemployment benefits was not the only
way of achieving lower unemployment.
The framework for this view was
published in the classic textbook
Unemployment: Macroeconomic
Performance and the Labour Market by
Richard Layard (CEP’s founder director),
Stephen Nickell and Richard Jackman 
(first edition 1992). Reviewing the 2005
edition in the Journal of Economic
Literature, MIT’s Olivier Blanchard wrote:
‘The book was and remains an
impressive achievement. The way
to read it however is not so 
much as a treatise than as a
manual of battlefield surgery. Its
purpose is clear: How to
understand, and then how to
reduce, unemployment in Europe,
by taking inventory of the
knowledge at hand.’
First, there had to be intellectual
foundations. This meant moving away
from the textbook model of perfect
competition in the labour market and
considering a more subtle and realistic
picture of how people worked. Together
with Dale Mortensen, Chris Pissarides
(director of CEP’s macroeconomics
programme from 1999 to 2007) 
developed job search theory, now 
regarded as the foundation for modern
unemployment theory.
The basic idea is that it takes time for
an employee to find a job and for an
employer to find an employee – so this
means that there will be an equilibrium
level of vacancies and unemployed as
individuals get ‘matched’ with jobs. 
Layard et al showed how many other
models of imperfect competition
(bargaining, efficiency wages, etc.) 
had some similar implications.
Second, these theories had to be
confronted with data both to test the
models and to put numbers on the 
strength of the relationships. Huge 
effort was invested in building up cross-
national macro and micro datasets that
could be used to perform statistically
rigorous analysis.
The next step was the implications for
policy. The basic message was that supply-
side policies to improve the matching
process between jobless workers and
vacancies were crucial. This implied an
agenda of ‘welfare to work’, something
that has been taken up by governments
around the world, particularly in the UK
since 1997.
An example of this is the New Deal for
Young People, first suggested by Richard
Layard and introduced by Gordon Brown 
in 1998 (and later extended to other
groups on welfare, including single
mothers and disabled people). The
philosophy of the reform was that long-
term unemployment was a huge waste of
resources as the jobless lost skills and
motivation and were no longer effectively
competing in the labour market and
dampening wage inflation. 
To combat this problem, a combination
of ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’ was needed. The
carrot was to give the unemployed help
with job search through intensive
information and mentoring at job centres.
Those who still struggled to find work
would be supported in subsidised work
and training programmes. The stick was
that those who refused work or other
options would lose their benefits. Elements
of a sanctions approach had been tried
before the Labour government but 
without the support package, they had
only limited success.
The story does not end there. A vital
part of policy is rigorous evaluation of
whether it works or not. I was deeply
involved in the first evaluation of the New
Deal, which required us to develop new
techniques and combine new datasets. 
We found that the programme did appear
to have major benefits, raising the job
finding rate by about 20%, and I argued
that on the whole these benefits
outweighed the costs. Subsequent work
has tended to support this conclusion.
The evaluations raised many questions:
what should be the balance between the
carrot and the stick? How effective is the
training option? Why does the New Deal
effect seem stronger when it was first
introduced than later? Why is the
aggregate effect not larger, and is the
youth labour market now running into
trouble? These questions feed back into
further developments of the theory and
other policies.
The overall lesson is that careful
economic research has real effects on
policy and the world.
John Van Reenen is director of CEP.eas
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The Job Seeker’s Allowance was introduced in
late 1996 to encourage benefit claimants to look
for work. New research by Barbara Petrongolo
investigates whether it has succeeded in
breaking the ‘unemployment trap’.
The unemployment trap
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T
he Job Seeker’s Allowance
(JSA) was introduced in the UK
on 7 October 1996. It replaced
the existing system of
unemployment benefits and income
support, and is currently the main welfare
support to the unemployed. It was
intended to break the ‘unemployment
trap’ in which workers were discouraged
from finding work because of the
availability of benefits.
The new system placed stringent
conditions on claimants – possibly forcing
some to stop claiming without finding a
new job first. Individuals who drop out of
the welfare system may become more
detached from the labour market and put
less effort into searching for a new job.
This may lower the employment rate in
the future – exactly the opposite effect of
the one intended.
The JSA has two distinct components:
 The contributory component, which
has limited duration, is not means-
tested and is based on previous
national insurance contributions. 
This component replaced
unemployment benefit.
 The means-tested component. 
In principle, this is an open-ended
measure that replaced income support.
The contributory component of the
JSA is more stringent than the
unemployment benefit that it replaced. It
is only payable for half a year (rather than
a full year), young people aged 16-25
receive less and there is no allowance for a
dependent spouse. In contrast, the means-
tested component of the JSA is payable at
the same level as the former measure of
income support. And as most support is
provided through this component, the
total effect of the changes was not large.
The most significant break with the
previous system was the substantial
increase in evidence that claimants had to
provide to demonstrate that they were
looking for work. Claimants now have to
sign a Jobseeker's Agreement in which
they agree to look for work actively and
commit to a number of specific ‘search
steps’. Such steps might include how
many employers they are going to contact
every week or how many times they are
going to contact a job centre. 
Claimants are required to keep a
detailed diary of each search step
undertaken, such as each phone call
made to a potential employer. The search
diary is then checked against the initial
agreement at fortnightly interviews with
the Employment Service – or more
frequently if a claimant is suspected of
fraud. Claimants may be ‘directed’ by 
the Employment Service staff to take
specific steps. 
If claimants are still unemployed after
13 weeks, they are required to broaden
their search and may not turn down job
Figure 1:
Flows into and out of the claimant count 
(seasonally adjusted)
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Figure 2:
The claimant count and the Labour Force Survey stock of
unemployed (seasonally adjusted)
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The Job Seeker’s
Allowance
introduced
conditions to
ensure claimants
were looking 
for work
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offers outside their main occupation
(although this is difficult to enforce). 
A claimant who fails to meet these
requirements is threatened with temporary
sanctions or disqualification from the 
JSA entirely.
Some of the effects of the JSA can be
seen by looking at flows of people into
and out of registered unemployment, as
Figure 1 shows. Soon after the
introduction of the JSA, there was a large
increase in the number of people stopping
claiming the JSA, with no increase in the
number of new claimants. This 
translated into a rapid decline in the
unemployment rate, which was already
falling in the months before the reform
came into effect. 
Official evaluations of the JSA carried
out by the then Department of Social
Security (now the Department for Work
and Pensions) show that the JSA increased
the number of people stopping claiming
benefits. This was largely due to a
‘weeding out’ effect: those who were not
serious about searching for a new job
were forced off the register. 
Their findings also show that the
average claimant increased his or her
efforts to find a new job. Of course, it is
possible that as less serious claimants were
weeded out, only claimants who were
trying to find a job remained. So it could
be that the remaining claimants were the
ones who were always more motivated,
rather than being motivated by the 
JSA directly.
Indeed, research by Alan Manning
(2005) finds that taking account of the
expenditure on unemployment benefits
has been lower under the JSA, if we take
account of the increase in incapacity
benefits, it is not clear whether the total
benefit expenditure was reduced. So it
remains unclear whether the move from
the unemployment benefit and income
support system to the JSA was beneficial
either in terms of reducing benefits or of
helping more people into work.
Some workers 
appear to have
moved off the Job
Seeker’s Allowance
and onto incapacity
benefit
The Job Seeker’s
Allowance reduced the
number of claimants –
but it also reduced the
number of claimants
finding work
This article summarises ‘What are the 
Long-term Effects of UI? Evidence from the
UK JSA Reform’ by Barbara Petrongolo,
CEP Discussion Paper No. 841
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0841.pdf).
Barbara Petrongolo is a lecturer in
economics at LSE and an associate in CEP’s
labour markets programme.
Further reading 
Stephen Machin and Olivier Marie (2008),
‘Crime and Benefit Sanctions’, Portuguese
Economic Journal (special issue on labour
economics), earlier version available 
as CEP Discussion Paper No. 645
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0645.pdf).
Alan Manning (2005), ‘You Can't 
Always Get What You Want: The Impact 
of the UK Job Seeker’s Allowance’,
CEP Discussion Paper No. 697
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0697.pdf).
behaviour of both claimants and non-
claimants, their average search effort did
not increase at all after the introduction of
the JSA.
Further effects of the JSA can be
evaluated by comparing two groups of job
seekers: those who became unemployed
shortly after the introduction of the JSA;
and those who became unemployed six
months earlier (and then adjusting for
seasonal factors using information on later
cohorts of claimants).
Although claimants affected by the
JSA system came off benefits more quickly
than claimants did under the old system,
they were 4% less likely to be in work a
year after they lost their job. This meant
that they were earning an average of
£600 less a year. 
What’s more, these effects were
stronger for young people (those aged up
to the age of 24), who experienced more
severe earnings losses than older workers
after the introduction of the JSA. 
As the JSA seems to have moved
claimants off benefits but not into new
jobs, it increased the number of non-
employed people who were not claiming
benefits. Figure 2 shows that the claimant
count – while being very close to the
Labour Force Survey (LFS) measure of
unemployment until 1996 – fell more
sharply than LFS unemployment after the
introduction of the JSA in late 1996.
So what happened to these workers
who were neither working nor claiming
benefits? Many may have become part of
the ‘hidden unemployed’ – but there are
other possibilities.
A study by Stephen Machin and Olivier
Marie (2008) shows that crime in the UK
rose more in areas that were most
affected by the tougher JSA benefit
regime. Could this mean that people
pushed out of the benefit system by the
new, more stringent standards were
turning to illicit methods of earning?
Possibly – but other factors could be at
work as well, so we must be careful in
claiming this.
Another possibility is that people
simply moved onto other benefits, notably
incapacity benefits. Indeed, individuals
covered by the JSA are 3% more likely to
take up incapacity benefits – and thus be
induced into longer-term dependency –
than individuals not covered by the JSA.
This has important consequences for
government spending on welfare. While
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Further reading
Alex Bryson and Richard Freeman (2006),
‘What Voice Do British Workers Want?’,
CEP Discussion Paper No. 731
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0731.pdf).
Richard Freeman (2005), ‘From the Webbs to the
Web: The Contribution of the Internet to Reviving
Union Fortunes’, in Susan Fernie and David
Metcalf (eds), Trade Unions: Resurgence or
Demise?, Routledge (summarised in CentrePiece:
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/CP182.pdf).
Richard Freeman, ‘Are European Labor Markets as
Awful as All That?’, CEP Discussion Paper No. 644
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0644.pdf).
Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers (1999),
What Workers Want, Cornell University Press.
Richard Freeman and James Medoff (1984),
What Do Unions Do?, Basic Books.
Understanding trade unions 
and the labour market
The prize, awarded by the Institute for the Study of Labor
(IZA) in Bonn, honours the pioneering work of
exceptionally creative scholars who have revolutionised
theoretical and empirical research on labour markets. The
prize committee includes Nobel Laureates George Akerlof
and Joseph Stiglitz, and the previous winners are Jacob
Mincer, Orley Ashenfelter, Ed Lazear, Dale Mortensen,
David Card, Alan Krueger and CEP’s Chris Pissarides.
The award team said: ‘By drawing attention to important
social problems and trends, Richard Freeman has greatly
extended the range of issues addressed in modern labour
economics. His analyses of inequality and discrimination,
the role of unions and the welfare state are extremely
valuable for the understanding of effective labour 
market policy.’
’In various studies, Freeman has proven that unions
perform multiple economically valuable functions which
reach far beyond their role in wage bargaining. These
contributions, which are among Freeman's most
influential research, have revolutionised the perception of
trade unionism in modern labour economics.’
’In light of globalised markets and international
competition, the trade unions' strategies should not be
confined to achieving higher wages. According to
Freeman, modern unions must also provide a direct
channel of communication between workers and
management and act as an intermediary to protect
employment and foster the creation of new jobs.’
’By serving as an institution of collective voice, unions
contribute to a higher level of job satisfaction and improve
workers' loyalty to the firm. Freeman has demonstrated
that union influence not only reduces absenteeism but
also promotes long-term employment relationships by
lowering the number of quits. This reduction in labour
turnover lowers hiring and training costs. More
importantly, it increases productivity by creating incentives
to invest in workers' education and skill enhancement.’
‘In this respect, trade unions who act constructively are of
vital importance to overall economic performance.
Freeman's research shows that non-dogmatic unions can
play a significant role in today's labour markets. It should
encourage union leaders to be more aware of their key
responsibility for the economy as a whole.’
’For more than three decades, Richard Freeman has been
among the internationally most active and influential
labour economists. His research, which has greatly
enriched the scientific debate, has also had a strong
impact on policy debates around the globe. Among the
institutions he has advised on economic policy issues are
the World Bank, the International Labour Organization
and the European Union. In addition, Freeman directs the
Program on Labor Studies at the National Bureau of
Economic Research.’ 
One of the results of the IZA prize will be a book based
on Richard Freeman’s articles published by Oxford
University Press. This will be about his research on labour
markets in the UK and continental Europe, work done
primarily at CEP.
Richard Freeman, professor of economics at Harvard
University, visiting professor at LSE and senior
research fellow in CEP’s research programmes on
labour markets and wellbeing, has been awarded the
IZA Prize in Labor Economics 2007.
in brief...
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Can pay regulation kill?
Nurses’ pay in England is set centrally with little local
variation. This means that hospitals in high cost areas like
London and the South East struggle to recruit and retain
staff. As a consequence, our research finds that they treat
fewer patients and have lower quality outcomes – for
example, much higher fatality rates among patients
admitted with emergency heart attacks.
These effects are not trivial: the results suggest that a
10% increase in the gap between the wages paid to NHS
nurses and those paid to women working in the private
sector locally raises the fatality rate among people
admitted with a heart attack by about 5%. 
Centralised pay setting happens in many public sector
labour markets like health, teaching and the police.
People often worry about the minimum wage pricing
people out of jobs. But when pay in a sector is set to be
almost the same across the country, it effectively imposes
a maximum wage on people living in parts of the South
East where wages outside the public sector are pushed
up by the tightness of the labour market. 
Nowhere is centralised pay setting more important than
in the NHS. More than a quarter of a million nurses in
England have their pay set by a single pay review body.
The process allows some local flexibility, but in practice
the gap between the wages paid to a nurse in Newcastle
and one in London is small compared with the pay gap
between women in those areas who are not nurses. 
The research looks at how centralised pay setting for
nurses in the NHS affects hospital performance by
tracking changes in the outside wage and changes in
performance in over 100 English hospital trusts over a six-
year period. 
Common sense would suggest that hospitals located in
places where outside opportunities are better are going
to struggle to recruit, retain and motivate staff. This is
John Van Reenen and colleagues present evidence on
the impact of regulating the labour market for nurses
on the performance of hospitals in England.
Centralised
pay setting for
nurses means
that hospitals
in high cost
areas struggle
to recruit and
retain staff
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exactly what the study finds: in areas like London where
the outside labour market is strong – where the wages of
nurses are lowest compared with their non-nurse
counterparts – nurse vacancy rates are higher and fewer
qualified nurses work in the NHS. 
But these recruitment difficulties are not confined to the
human resources department. More worryingly, they feed
into a lower quality of service provision and poorer
outcomes for patients. Hospitals in areas where the
outside labour market is strong have lower volumes of
activity relative to their staffing levels. They also have
higher fatality rates among patients who are admitted
with emergency heart attacks. A 10% increase in the
outside wage means a 5% increase in death rates from
heart attacks.
None of these effects are present in firms operating in
the private sector. Nor do they seem to arise because
hospitals in high cost areas face greater financial
problems or have patients who are sicker – in fact,
patients in many high external wage areas generally have
better health than those in low external wage areas.
One key problem is that hospitals that find it difficult to
recruit permanent staff rely more on temporary agency
staff. These nurses can be paid at a higher rate to get
around the pay regulation. But they often tend to have
less experience and training, and will not know the
hospital as well as someone on a permanent contract.
The maps in Figure 1 show the link between outside
wages and use of temporary agency nurses who are less
experienced in working in the hospital. In the first map,
the areas with the highest outside wages are marked in
red and those with the lowest outside wages are marked
in blue: it is clear that the large cities and the South East
have higher outside wages. The second map shows the
intensity of use of agency nurses, and the spatial
distribution is very similar to that of the first map: where
outside wages are high, use of agency nurses is high.
The study uses data from 1995 to 2002 and there have
been some relaxations in the rules since then with more
recruitment bonuses and cost of living allowances. But it
is still the case that public sector workers are taking a
much bigger effective pay cut compared with similarly
skilled workers in lower cost areas. 
The lessons can be used throughout the public sector.
Instead of across the board pay increases, the right thing
to do is to allow wages in the high cost areas of the
South to increase at a much faster rate than the low cost
areas of the North. This should be done in schools and
police departments as well as hospitals. Only then will the
death premium of London be properly tackled.
This article summarises ‘Can Pay Regulation Kill? Panel Data Evidence
on the Effect of Labour Markets on Hospital Performance’ by Emma
Hall, Carol Propper and John Van Reenen, CEP Discussion Paper No.
843 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0843.pdf).
Emma Hall is at the Centre for Market and Public Organisation
(CMPO) at the University of Bristol. Carol Propper is at CMPO and
Imperial College, London. John Van Reenen is director of CEP.
Figure 1:
Outside wages and the use of agency nurses
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T
he phenomenal growth of
China’s manufacturing sector
over the last decade has
been fuelled in large part by
a seemingly inexhaustible
supply of cheap labour. The opening of the
Chinese economy has enabled a country
with one fifth of the world’s population to
make more use of that resource. Labour
shortages in urban areas are supported by
mass migration from the countryside. 
But even in China, the supply of workers
is not infinite and economic growth is
leading to wage growth. With rapidly
increasing wage rates and an ageing
population (due in large part to the 
one-child policy instituted in 1978), 
Chinese manufacturing is set to change.
Can China’s manufacturing sector
continue to grow even with rapidly rising
bills? And what about the other Asian 
giant: can Indian manufacturing start to
catch up with China by raising its annual
growth rate to the 10%-plus levels that
China has enjoyed?
One key factor is the quality of
management in these countries. 
If management practices are poor in
comparison with those in Europe, Japan and
the United States, Chinese and Indian firms
will be less able to compete as their costs
increase. But if Chinese and Indian firms are
able to adopt world-class management
practices, then the phenomenal growth
rates of these industries may continue for
many years.
CEP’s research programme with
McKinsey & Company and Stanford
University makes it possible to compare
management quality in China and India
The economies of China and India have been
booming – but do they have the quality of
corporate management to sustain growth over
the longer term? Using CEP’s global survey of
over 4,000 firms, Nick Bloom and Rebecca
Homkes evaluate management practices in the
two countries’ manufacturing sectors.
Can better management
sustain growth 
in China and India?
CentrePiece Spring 2008
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(Bloom, Dorgan et al, 2007). During the
summer of 2006, our team contacted over
4,000 medium-sized manufacturing firms
across Europe, India, Japan and the United
States, and spoke directly with plant
managers about their firms’ management
practices. In the summer of 2007, we
extended this survey to China.
Measuring management in a systematic way requires
codifying the concept of good and bad management into a
measure applicable to different firms. We used an interview-
based management practice evaluation tool that defines and
scores from 1 (worst practice) to 5 (best practice) across 18
of the key management practices that appear to matter to
industrial firms, based on McKinsey’s expertise in working
with thousands of companies across several decades. For full
details of the survey methodology, including all the
questions, see Bloom and Van Reenen (2007).
The 18 practices fall into four broad areas:
 Shopfloor operations: have companies adopted both the
letter and the spirit of lean manufacturing?
 Performance monitoring: how well do companies track
what goes on inside their firms?
 Target setting: do companies set the right targets, track
the right outcomes and take appropriate action if the two
don’t tally?
 Incentive setting: are companies hiring, developing and
keeping the right people and providing them with
incentives to succeed?
Measuring
management
practices
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The average Chinese 
and Indian firm is poorly
managed
The research finds that comparing across
all the countries in the sample, the
average management scores for Chinese
and Indian firms are the lowest (see Figure
1). Despite recent media attention for the
impact of principles of lean manufacturing
in China and India, both countries still lag
behind in terms of modern manufacturing
techniques and practices. Their firms also
underperform in terms of incentive
structures and people management.
By comparison, firms from more
developed countries – Germany, Japan,
Sweden and the United States – are well
managed. France, Italy, Poland and the UK
are all solidly mid-table, while worryingly
for Portugal and Greece, their
management practices appear to be only
slightly better than those in China and
India. This suggests that the OECD
countries’ advantages in management
should not be overstated and that China
and India may be catching up.
What’s more, although the average
Chinese and Indian firm performs badly,
this disguises tremendous variation in
management practices within each
country. The best Chinese and Indian firms
are as well managed as those in the UK
and the United States (see Figure 2).
Indeed, rather alarmingly for the
British and Americans, many of their firms
– about a quarter of UK firms and 15% of
US firms – are actually worse managed
than the average Chinese and Indian
firms.  And while roughly one third of well
managed Chinese and Indian firms are
foreign multinationals, two thirds are
excellently run domestic firms.
Another notable result illustrated in
Figure 2 is the marked variation in
management practices in India, especially
in comparison with China. While India has
a large upper and lower tail of over- and
underperforming firms, Chinese firms are
solidly clustered slightly below average.
The domestic Indian firms with poor
management practices are typically
government owned or family firms that
practice primogeniture (handing down the
CEO position to the eldest son). They stand
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Figure 1:
Chinese and Indian firms are the worst managed on average
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France
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United States
The bars indicate for each country the average score on the 18 management
questions (1=worst practice, 5=best practice).
For each company in the study, researchers interviewed one
or two senior plant-level managers, who knew only that they
were taking part in a ‘research’ project. These managers
were selected because they were senior enough to have a
reasonable perspective on what happens in a company but
not so senior that they might be out of touch with the
shopfloor. The interviews relied on open questions and the
interviewers were trained to probe for details of practices on
the ground.
The interviews were run by an international team of 47
postgraduate students (mainly MBAs), who worked from CEP
in a specially created survey centre during the summer of
2006. This was a 24-hour operation since the Chinese day
starts at midnight in London, just before managers on the
West Coast of the United States pack up to go home. 
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The average
Chinese and
Indian firm is
better managed
than a quarter 
of UK firms 
in sharp contrast to some of India’s well-
known industrial giants, which operate
using world-class management practices.
India also displays a substantially larger
spread of productivity across
manufacturing plants than China. This
suggests that there is something in the
Indian business environment that is
conducive to much more variation in
management practices and productivity
than in China, a phenomenon we are
currently researching. 
Which firms are getting 
it right?
To understand why China and India have
these underperforming firms with poor
management practices, we segmented the
firms by broad ownership category. We
find that multinational firms are well
managed everywhere. These firms are
typically the Chinese and Indian
manufacturing operations of successful
European, Japanese and US firms, which
have transferred their world-class
management practices abroad. 
In stark contrast, foreign joint ventures
– in which foreign and domestic firms
share ownership – tend to struggle. Most
of these ventures are located in China.
They date from regulations introduced in
1979, which required foreign investors to
set up joint ventures with local firms in
order to gain entry to the market. (It was
not until 1986 that the first wholly-owned
foreign enterprise was established.) 
Given the complex management
structures that shared ownership entails
(multiple layers of domestic and foreign
management and shareholder boards),
managerial clashes seem to have plagued
the organisation of operations and
incentives. Combined with the inherent
cultural and language clashes, these
foreign joint ventures adopted substantially
worse management practices than even
many domestic firms. 
Other firms that are poorly managed
are those owned and run by families. Such
firms are particularly common in India but
rare in China (there has been a more
recent drive towards private family
ownership in China, but this was difficult
prior to 1979). Given the difficulties of
separating ownership from control in India
(arising from problems in the legal system),
family firms rarely bring in external
management. 
Government firms are also extremely
CentrePiece Spring 2008
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Figure 2:
Chinese and Indian firms are better managed than about 
25% of UK firms and 15% of US firms
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Government firms and firms
owned and run by families are
very poorly managed
The charts show the distribution of firms across management scores 
(1=worst practice, 5=best practice) within each country.
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badly run in both countries (and indeed
across all the countries in the sample),
with particularly weak management of
workers and a lack of modern
manufacturing techniques.
In recent years, there has been a
strong push in former Chinese state-
owned firms towards dispersing ownership
among their workers. With reforms to
India’s legal system, government and
family-run firms may diminish in
importance there as well. This may pave
the way to a brighter future for the two
countries’ manufacturing sectors if firms
can adapt their practices to match those
of their competitors.
Managerial over-optimism is
not equated with strong
management practices 
Since good management is strongly linked
with good performance, why is it that not
all firms make a priority of improving their
practices? To examine the possible causes
of this disconnect, we asked managers as
a final question in the interview to assess
the overall management performance of
their firm. To avoid false modesty, they
were asked to exclude their personal
performance from the calculation.
The answers indicate that Chinese and
Indian managers are particularly over-
optimistic about their management
practices. The average Chinese and Indian
firm’s self-assessment is that its
management is better than the average
French, Italian, Japanese, Polish, Swedish,
UK and US firm.
This is particularly striking given how
poorly managed the average Chinese and
Indian firms are in comparison with their
European, Japanese and US counterparts.
In fact, the only country with distinctly
more optimistic managers is Greece, which
has the third-worst managed firms in the
sample.
Chinese and Indian firms
tend to be highly centralised
More than management practices, the
degree of management autonomy within
a firm can affect its productivity, especially
in terms of its ability to implement
processes and make timely decisions. We
find huge variations in the extent to which
power is centralised within firms’
corporate headquarters rather than
delegated to individual plant managers.
The corporate headquarters of some
Figure 3:
Foreign multinationals are well managed in China and 
India, but foreign joint ventures are not
2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.2
Government
Family owned, family CEO
Foreign joint venture (China only)
Domestic firm, non-family owned
Family owned but external CEO
Foreign multinational
Figure 4:
Chinese and Indian managers are more over-confident 
than European, US and Japanese managers
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■ Self-assessed management
■ Our management score
The bars indicate for each country the average score on the 18 management questions and the
average score on the self-assessed management question: ‘Excluding yourself, how well
managed is your firm on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is worst practice, 10 is best practice and 5 is
average’. The scores are divided by 2 to put them on the same scale as our management scores.
The bars indicate the average score on the 18 management questions (1=worst practice,
5=best practice) for each type of firm ownership in China and India.
Average self-assessed management score in China and India
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firms treat their production plants almost
as independent entities, letting plant
managers make decisions on hiring,
investment, sales and product
development. But others directly control
almost every aspect of their plants’
activities, leaving little decision-making
power to plant managers.
To investigate this variation in
decentralisation, we asked plant managers
about the degree of autonomy they had in
four activities: hiring new full-time workers;
making capital investments; controlling
their sales and marketing; and introducing
new products. We combined these four
indicators into one overall measure of plant
managers’ autonomy, where high values
indicate that decisions are decentralised to
plant managers and low values indicate
that they are taken at corporate
headquarters.
Figure 5 plots this measure of
autonomy across countries. The substantial
variation is evident as firms in Northern
Europe and the United States are typically
decentralised compared with the very
hierarchical ones in Asia and Southern
Europe.
In related work (Bloom, Sadun and Van
Reenen, 2007), we find that this degree of
decentralisation is positively related to the
productivity of information technology (IT).
Firms in which managers and workers are
more autonomous appear to make much
better use of IT, presumably because their
greater operating freedom enables them to
experiment and adapt the IT to their local
environment.
This highlights a potential future
problem for Chinese and Indian firms.
Their highly centralised management
structures are likely to be less effective as
production technologies become
increasingly computer-intensive.
The future of Chinese and
Indian manufacturing
While the results of our survey highlight
the fact that Chinese and India firms have
below average management practices, this
is mainly due to a long tail of poorly run
government and traditional family firms. As
the two countries develop, both in terms
of local markets and ownership structures,
the proportion of these firms should
continue to shrink rapidly.
The newly organised and changing
firms that adopt competitive best practices
should push average standards of
management practices towards those in
Europe and United States. Thus, even as
Chinese and Indian wage rates and raw
materials costs start to rise, the negative
effects could be offset by an improvement
in management practices.
But a possible cloud on the horizon for
these countries is the hierarchical
organisation of their firms, which, as our
research shows, impedes the effective
adoption of IT. Whether Chinese and
Indian firms can also modernise the
organisation of their firms alongside their
management practices is a key question,
and one that CEP researchers will continue
to investigate.
This research was jointly funded by the
Anglo-German Foundation and the Economic
and Social Research Council.
Nick Bloom is an assistant professor of
economics at Stanford University and a
research associate in CEP’s productivity and
innovation programme.
Rebecca Homkes is management research
project manager in CEP’s productivity and
innovation programme, and has been
overseeing the Chinese survey.
Further reading
Nick Bloom, Stephen Dorgan, John Dowdy,
Christos Genakos, Raffaella Sadun and John
Van Reenen (2007), ’Management Practices
and Productivity: Why They Matter’
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/management/
Management_Practice_and_Productivity.pdf).
Nick Bloom and John Van Reenen (2007),
‘Measuring and Explaining Management
Practices across Firms and Nations’,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(4):
1351-408 (earlier version available as CEP
Discussion Paper No. 716:
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0716.pdf).
Nick Bloom, Raffaella Sadun and 
John Van Reenen (2007), ‘Measuring and
Explaining Decentralisation across Firms and
Countries’, LSE/Stanford mimeo
(http://www.stanford.edu/~nbloom/
decent.pdf).
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Figure 5:
Asian firms are much more centralised (hierarchical) than
Northern European and US firms
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investment, sales and new products, by country
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Chinese and Indian
firms are much more
centralised than
Northern European 
and US firms
T
he central feature of
China’s transition from a
centrally planned economy
is the development of the
non-state sector – private
firms led by an emerging class of
entrepreneurs. In 1978, the first year of
reform in China, the state sector
accounted for over 90% of the country’s
GDP; by 2005, this had fallen to less than
half (see Figure 1). 
Not all of China’s growth
achievements can be attributed to
entrepreneurs. Rural industries – the
township and village enterprises –
contributed a growing proportion from
the early 1980s onwards and accounted
for nearly a third of GDP in the mid-
1990s. And foreign investors also played a
role from around that time.
But since the late 1990s, China’s
entrepreneurs have been the key driver of
growth. They are the creators of the 
de novo firms that are forming a dynamic
and innovative private sector – an 
essential force in any developing country
(see, for example, Wu, 2002, and Zhang 
et al, 2006).
What do we know about the people
who have had the wherewithal to start a
business or work for themselves? What
kinds of personal traits differentiate them
from people who choose not to embrace
entrepreneurship? The findings from a
national household survey conducted in
China’s remarkable economic growth
has been achieved through the rapid
emergence of a dynamic private sector.
Linda Yueh explores what we know
about the generation of self-employed
entrepreneurs who have driven this
transformation.
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Figure 1:
State-owned enterprises’ share of GDP, 1978-2005
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China’s 
entrepreneurs
China’s economy is
increasingly driven
by competition,
innovation and
productivity
urban China in 2000 shed some light on
these questions.
The rise of China’s
entrepreneurial class
The dramatic growth in the share of self-
employed entrepreneurs in the Chinese
workforce is evident from the mid-1990s
(see Figure 2). It is most apparent in the
rural areas where there were no recorded
private enterprises until 1994.
The upward trend continues in urban
areas as in the country as a whole. But in
rural areas, self-employment now seems
to be falling. Given the massive migration
from rural to urban areas, this may well
reflect the limited opportunities for rural
industries to develop when competing
against the advantages of urban
companies and markets.
Overall, the increase in
entrepreneurship in China bodes well for
sustained economic growth. But the
emergence of China’s entrepreneurs has
not been without obstacles. By
guaranteeing employment and providing
social security in the absence of a national
safety net, the lifetime employment
system in the state-owned enterprises
(known as the ‘iron rice bowl’) strongly
discouraged urban workers from
becoming self-employed. 
Not until the dismantling of the
employment system and the massive
layoffs accompanying the restructuring of
state-owned enterprises in the mid-1990s
did private Chinese firms begin to 
flourish (Knight and Yueh, 2004). And by
providing an alternative source of
employment and revenue, the emerging
non-state sector has given the 
government leeway in its efforts to
downsize and reform state-owned
enterprises (Fan, 1994).
Another institutional challenge faced
by entrepreneurs has been limited access
to credit. A recent estimate by the first
Chinese chief economist of the World
Bank suggests that out of 40 million small
and medium-sized enterprises in China in
2006, less than half of 1% could obtain
loans from banks (Lin, 2007).
Aspiring entrepreneurs have also faced
a shortage of key assets such as land 
or property (the property market did 
not develop until the late 1990s) and
insecure property rights in a system that
did not protect private ownership officially
until 2004. Having property in China
suggests being fairly well connected as
urban (and, for the most part, rural) land
is state-owned and privatisation of land
and buildings has only begun recently. 
When the survey asked entrepreneurs
why they started their own business, 37%
said that it was because they had the
requisite skills and experience, 17%
started a business by joining in with
relatives, 11% had property and 7% 
had funds.
Comparing entrepreneurs
and non-entrepreneurs
So which characteristics distinguish
entrepreneurs from non-entrepreneurs in
China? Comparing people who have
started their own business as their primary
or secondary job with people who remain
in paid employment, the first notable
difference is in annual incomes. As 
Figure 3 shows, between 1995 and 1999,
the average entrepreneur earned over
35% more than the average person in
paid employment.
As Table 1 shows, there are a 
large number of similarities between
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. 
The average age of both groups is 35,
both have identical years of education and
nearly 85% of both groups are married.
There are, though, a number of
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Figure 2:
Entrepreneurs as a percentage of total employment in 
China: national, urban and rural areas
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China’s
entrepreneurs 
are more likely
to have
experienced
unemployment
than people 
in paid
employment
significant differences. The first is that
nearly 18% of non-entrepreneurs are
members of the Chinese Communist Party
compared with just 6% of entrepreneurs.
It may be that Party membership protects
against retrenchment and thus reduces the
likelihood of someone stepping out into
the private sector.
Second, nearly a third of entrepreneurs
have experienced unemployment
compared with less than a fifth of non-
entrepreneurs. This makes the difference
in incomes all that more remarkable, as
individuals who have experienced
unemployment tend to suffer from
‘scarring’, which results in a lower wage
when they are in work again. But having
experienced unemployment during the
large-scale layoffs of the mid- to late
1990s seems to be a significant factor in
becoming an entrepreneur.
Third, entrepreneurs have larger social
networks. In the context of a weak legal
system and opaque regulatory structure,
perhaps it is not surprising that starting
one’s own business requires contacts to
secure supplies and distribution as well as
operating licences.
The personal traits of
Chinese entrepreneurs
Considering all of the relevant personal,
socio-economic and attitudinal traits,
estimates of the probability of
entrepreneurship find that women and
people who have been in employment for
a number of years are less likely to be
entrepreneurs. Some features of an
individual’s socio-economic background
also affect his or her potential for
entrepreneurship.
Having a more educated mother or
one who is in a non-manual or
professional job increases the likelihood of
entrepreneurship, while having a father
who is a Communist Party member
decreases the likelihood. Mothers who are
more accomplished seem to encourage
their children to start their own
businesses, while fathers with connections
to the Party seem to reduce the job
insecurity of their children.
Having a larger social network and a
willingness to embrace risk also
significantly increases the likelihood of
becoming an entrepreneur.
A number of questions about attitudes
asked of a sample that had experienced
unemployment are also revealing. When
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Figure 3:
Annual incomes of Chinese entrepreneurs and 
non-entrepreneurs in renminbi (RMB)
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Table 1:
Differences between Chinese entrepreneurs 
and non-entrepreneurs
Personal characteristics Entrepreneurs Non-entrepreneurs
Age 35.6 35.8
Years of employment experience 12.3 22.8
Have experienced layoff 27.8% 19.2%
Years of education 9.4 9.4
Gender 55.7% male 49.7% male
44.3% female 51.3% female
Marital status 83.4% married 84.2% married
Communist Party member 6.2% 17.7%
Social network (size) 8.2 6.4
Socio-economic background
Father’s education (years) 5.4 5.2
Mother’s education (years) 6.0 5.9
Father is/was Communist Party member 26.5% 34.2%
Mother is/was Communist Party member 8.7% 10.8%
Father is/was self-employed 3.9% 2.8%
Mother is/was self-employed 1.7% 1.8%
Father is/was non-manual worker 22.3% 28.4%
Mother is/was non-manual worker 8.1% 13.7%
Income
Annual income (RMB) 8475 5986
Average annual income (RMB), 1995-98 5751 4312
Source: Chinese Household Income Project survey, 2000
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considering an opportunity for work, both
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs
value wages, social security provision,
good working conditions and the ability to
learn skills on the job.
But they differ in that entrepreneurs
do not worry as much about job stability
or job dignity, and curiously, despite their
higher earnings, they are less inclined than
non-entrepreneurs to hope that their
children will become entrepreneurs. And
as is found among entrepreneurs across
the world, the drive to earn money is a
significant determinant of
entrepreneurship.
Conclusion
The remarkable growth of China has been
driven by various engines. The most
notable is the development of the non-
state sector, fuelled by the desire of
millions of Chinese people to seek a better
life. The easing of the state’s control over
the economy allowed the emergence of a
generation of entrepreneurs, who have
transformed the economy into one
increasingly driven by competition,
innovation and productivity.
The personal traits of China’s
entrepreneurs have much in common with
those who remained in paid employment.
But there are also notable differences:
being female, older or a member of the
Communist Party all significantly reduce
the probability of becoming an
entrepreneur.
These traits are not dissimilar to
entrepreneurs elsewhere (see, for example,
Djankov et al, 2005). Being female and
older tend to discourage people from
starting their own business in many
countries. And as in the West, social
networks, a healthy attitude to risk and an
inclination to work hard are all traits
associated with entrepreneurs in China.
Until recently, not much was known
about these entrepreneurs, but the
emerging picture is one of a group of
individuals who are able to navigate
China’s uncertain institutional terrain and
find opportunities in the world’s
potentially most significant market. Their
foray into overseas markets is as inevitable
as the rise of China. 
This article summarises ‘China’s
Entrepreneurs’ by Linda Yueh,
University of Oxford, Department of
Economics, Discussion Paper No. 324
(http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/Research/wp/
pdf/paper324.pdf) and forthcoming in 
World Development.
Linda Yueh is fellow in economics at St
Edmund Hall, University of Oxford, and an
associate in CEP’s globalisation programme.
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India’s foreign investment policy:
the impact on productivity
A particularly striking feature of India’s foreign 
investment regime since the 1990s has been that it
encourages the adoption of foreign technology by
domestic firms while at the same time opening up these
industry sectors to foreign investors. So liberalisation
consists of two distinct components: 
 Foreign direct investment (FDI), defined by the
International Monetary Fund as a foreign firm taking at
least a 10% stake in a domestic firm.
 Foreign technology agreements (FTA), more ‘arm’s-
length’ transactions in which a foreign firm enters into
partnership with a domestic firm. 
The relative importance of the two components can be
gauged by the fact that in the post-reform period
(between August 1991 and January 2005 in this study),
the number of FDI projects approved by the Indian
government was nearly 19,000 and the number of FTAs
approved was just over 7,600.
Unlike in many East Asian countries, Indian policy-makers
have resisted the temptation to offer subsidies to 
foreign investors (at least until very recently). Instead, 
they have pursued a two-pronged strategy of inviting 
FDI from foreign firms as well as encouraging FTAs by
domestic firms.
Previous research has shown that increasing FDI leads to
greater competition in industries where firms compete
with each other at a single stage of the production
process. The effect of increased competitive pressure is to
lower the mark-ups that domestic firms are able to
charge, thereby reducing their measured productivity.
This is typically not outweighed by any productivity
benefits to domestic firms from observing and copying the
techniques used by foreign firms – what are known as
‘technology spillovers’. For firms in these industries to gain
significantly from technology spillovers, they need to 
be technologically advanced or close to the ‘technology
frontier’.
But in vertically integrated industries (where firms operate
at more than one stage of the production process),
previous research suggests that the effect of FDI on
productivity is positive. This implies that both domestic
and foreign firms benefit from technology spillovers.
Chawla’s research finds that liberalisation of the foreign
investment regime in India has significantly improved the
performance of manufacturing firms. This is surprising as
the sample mainly consists of firms that compete at a
single stage of production. What seems to have happened
is that the policy of encouraging FTAs has had an effect
equivalent to technology spillovers, moving domestic firms
closer to the technology frontier, albeit through different
means.
Since the industries studied were simultaneously 
subjected to both FDI and FTA liberalisation, it is not easy
to distinguish between the effects of two policies. 
To do this, the research looks in detail at the motor vehicle
industry. It finds that in this sector at least, the two
elements of the foreign investment regime have been
complementary in their positive impact on firms’
productivity.
India’s experiences are often compared with China’s, and
while the latter has attracted greater FDI inflows than the
former since the early 1990s, India has attracted greater
portfolio investment and the ratio of market capitalisation
of its listed firms to GDP has been higher. What’s more,
Indian firms now invest so much abroad that FDI outflows
almost match FDI inflows.
The fact that India’s foreign investment liberalisation treats
foreign technology and direct investment as inseparable is
important here. Such a policy is bound to have effects
beyond the simple enumeration of FDI inflow figures. At
least one important implication of this policy is its positive
effect on the productivity of manufacturing firms.
Arunish Chawla is an occasional research
assistant in CEP’s globalisation programme.
India’s liberalisation has been successful
by its openness to both foreign
investment and foreign technology
in brief...
What kind of liberalisation policies can make a difference to
firms’ productivity? Research by Arunish Chawla explores
this question in the context of India’s economic
liberalisation of the 1990s. He analyses the impact of foreign
investment policy on the performance of Indian
manufacturing firms over a 15-year period.
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Recent research by Nick Bloom – as well as
research of an earlier vintage by Fed
chairman Ben Bernanke – suggests that the
impact of the credit crunch on uncertainty
will lead to an economic slowdown much
worse than we currently anticipate.
Will the 
credit crunch 
lead to recession? 
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O
ne of the most striking
effects of the recent
credit crunch is a huge
surge in stock market
volatility. The uncertainty
over the extent of financial damage, the
identity of the next banking casualty and
the unpredictability of the policy response
of central banks and governments have
all led to tremendous instability.
A standard measure of uncertainty –
the ‘implied volatility’ of the S&P100 of
the US stock market, commonly known
as the index of ‘financial fear’ – has
more than doubled since the subprime
crisis first emerged in August 2007. This
jump in uncertainty is of similar
magnitude to those that followed the
Cuban missile crisis, the assassination of
President Kennedy, the Gulf War and the
terrorist attacks of 9/11 (see Figure 1).
But after these earlier ‘shocks’,
volatility spiked and then quickly fell
back. For example, after 9/11, implied
volatility dropped back to baseline levels
within two months. In contrast, the
current levels of implied volatility have
remained stubbornly high for the last
seven months, rising rather than abating
as the crisis continues.
My research shows that even the
temporary surges in uncertainty that
followed previous shocks had very
destructive effects. The average 
impact of the 16 shocks plotted in Figure
1 (before the credit crunch) was to cut
US GDP by 2% over the next six months
(Bloom, 2007).
So the omens for the impact of the
current credit crunch are worrying. If
these earlier temporary spikes in
uncertainty had such a significant effect
on economic activity, the impact of the
current persistent spike in uncertainty is
likely to be far worse. On these numbers,
a recession is almost inevitable.
For a broader historical comparison
to the credit crunch, we can also go
back 70 years to the Great Depression.
Figure 1:
Monthly US stock market volatility 1962-2008
Note: The vertical axis shows a percentage measure of volatility known as ‘annualised standard
deviation’. Prior to 1986, this is calculated as the percentage actual volatility of monthly returns
on the S&P500 index of the US stock market. After 1986, it is calculated using the percentage
‘implied volatility’ from an option on the S&P100 index.
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The large and
persistent rise 
in uncertainty
since last August
is likely to be
very damaging 
to the economy
unpredictable, the best course of action is
often to wait.
If every firm in the economy waits,
then economic activity slows down. 
This directly cuts back on investment 
and employment, two of the main drivers
of economic growth. But it also has
knock-on effects in depressing
productivity growth.
Most productivity growth comes 
from ‘creative destruction’ – productive
firms expanding and unproductive 
firms shrinking. But if every firm 
in the economy pauses, then creative
destruction temporarily freezes –
productive firms do not grow and
unproductive firms do not contract. This
leads to a stalling of productivity growth.
Similarly damaging effects also
happen on the consumers’ side: when
uncertainty is high, people avoid buying
consumer durables like cars, fridges and
TVs. The housing market is also hit hard:
uncertainty makes people cautious about
upscaling their house.
One reassuring fact is that global
This was the last time that volatility was
persistently high (see Figure 2).
Much like the credit crunch today, the
Great Depression began with a stock
market crash and a meltdown of the
financial system. Banks withdrew credit
lines and the interbank lending market
froze up. The US central bank – the
Federal Reserve – desperately scrambled
to restore calm but without success.
What followed were massive levels of
stock market volatility and a recession of
unprecedented proportions. From 1929 to
1933, US GDP fell by 50%, a bigger drop
than in every recession since World War II
combined. On these numbers, a recession
not only looks almost inevitable, but its
longer-run effects start to become
alarming.
So why is this rise in uncertainty likely
to be so damaging for the economy? The
reason is that firms typically postpone
making investment and hiring decisions
when business conditions are uncertain. It
is expensive to make a hiring or
investment mistake – so if conditions are
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Figure 2:
The Great Depression was notable for very high volatility
Note: The vertical axis shows a measure of volatility derived from Schwert (1990), which contains daily stock returns to the Dow Jones
composite portfolio from 1885 to 1927, and to the Standard and Poor’s composite portfolio from 1928 to 1962. The figure plots the
volatility of monthly returns following exactly the same procedure as for the actual volatility data from 1962 to 1985 in Figure 1.
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Much like the
credit crunch
today, the Great
Depression
began with a
stock market
crash and a
meltdown of the
financial system
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policy-making is in safe hands. The
damaging effect of uncertainty shocks is
well known to Fed chairman Ben
Bernanke. His doctoral thesis of more
than 25 years ago explored the negative
effects of uncertainty shocks.
The main paper from that thesis was
pioneering in the way it formalised the
negative effects of uncertainty in causing
recessions, noting that: ‘events whose
long-run implications are uncertain can
create an investment cycle by temporarily
increasing the returns to waiting for
information’ (Bernanke, 1983).
So what is stopping Bernanke acting
to counteract this rise in uncertainty and
forestall the recession? Well, as Bernanke
also knows, the same forces of
uncertainty that lead to a recession also
render policy-makers relatively powerless
to prevent it.
When uncertainty is high, firms
become cautious, so they react much less
readily to monetary and fiscal policy
shocks. According to research on UK
firms, which I conducted with two
colleagues, uncertainty shocks typically
reduce the responsiveness of firms by
more than half, leaving monetary and
fiscal policy-makers relatively powerless
(Bloom et al, 2007).
So the current situation is a perfect
storm – a huge surge in uncertainty that
is not only generating a rapid slowdown
in activity but also limiting the
effectiveness of standard monetary and
fiscal policy to prevent this.
Policy-makers are doing the best they
can – making huge cuts in interest rates,
dishing out tax rebates and aggressively
pouring liquidity into the financial
markets. But will this be enough? History
suggests not. A recession looks likely.
Further reading
Ben Bernanke (1983), ‘Irreversibility,
Uncertainty and Cyclical Investment’,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(1):
85-106.
Nick Bloom (2007), ‘The Impact of
Uncertainty Shocks’, National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper No.
W13385, also available as CEP Discussion
Paper No. 718 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/
download/dp0718.pdf).
Nick Bloom, Stephen Bond and John Van
Reenen (2007), ‘Uncertainty and Investment
Dynamics’, Review of Economic Studies 74:
391-415.
William Schwert (1990), ‘Indexes of U.S. Stock
Prices from 1802 to 1987’, Journal of Business
63(3): 399-426.
The forces of
uncertainty that
lead to a
recession also
render policy-
makers relatively
powerless to
prevent it
Nick Bloom is an assistant professor of
economics at Stanford University and a
research associate in CEP’s productivity and
innovation programme.
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Do newly appointed external members of the Bank of
England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) hide their true
views on the right level for interest rates? Stephen Hansen
and Michael McMahon look back at their voting records
over the 10 years since the MPC was first given control of
UK monetary policy-making.
On coming into office in May 1997, Gordon Brown, the
new Chancellor of the Exchequer relinquished his power
to set UK interest rates and passed responsibility to an
independent body to be known as the Monetary Policy
Committee (MPC). The central idea behind this decision
was that with trained experts rather than politicians
setting interest rates, there would be less scope for
political manipulation and monetary policy-making would
therefore have greater credibility.
Such an institutional arrangement is increasingly common
around the world. What is slightly unusual in the UK case
is that the Bank of England Act 1998, which established
the MPC, requires the chancellor to appoint four of the
nine committee members from outside the Bank. These
external members join five internal members – the
governor, two deputy governors, the chief economist and
the executive director for market operations – to make up
the MPC.
Other countries also appoint experts from outside 
their central bank, but the experts typically then take 
up a senior position within the bank. At times, such
appointments happen in the UK: for example, some of
the internal MPC members were appointed from outside
the Bank but joined the in-house staff on their
appointment.
Every month, since the first meeting on 6 June 1997, the
MPC has met to decide interest rates by majority vote.
With the entire UK economy affected, the MPC makes its
decision on the basis of the one thing that economists
agree monetary policy can control: prices. The MPC remit,
as defined in the 1998 Act, is to ‘maintain price stability,
and subject to that, to support the economic policy of
Her Majesty's government, including its objectives for
growth and employment.’
In practice, the committee seeks to achieve a target
inflation rate of 2%, based on the consumer price index. If
inflation is greater than 3% or less than 1%, the governor
must write an open letter to the chancellor explaining
what has happened. In fact, the MPC has been very
successful and the last 10 years have been a period of
unprecedented stability for the UK both in terms of
inflation keeping within target and GDP growth.
Despite the collective success of the committee, the voting
differences of internal and external members (which are
revealed in the publicly available minutes of MPC meetings)
have been heavily scrutinised in the financial press. Those
voting for higher interest rates are labelled inflation
‘hawks’; those voting for lower rates are ‘doves’.
Using these voting records, our research examines the
behaviour of the external members. According to the
Bank, ‘the appointment of external members is designed
to ensure that the MPC benefits from thinking and
expertise in addition to that gained inside the Bank of
England.’
We start from the premise that when MPC members
(internal and external) vote on interest rates, they try to
ensure that the inflation target is achieved. Furthermore,
during the monthly meeting, members will communicate
their views to the other MPC members. By taking 
account of every other member's view of the world,
individual members can formulate their best – and 
possibly different – guess of what interest rates should 
be. Thus, the differences in voting behaviour between
members, which are apparent in the voting records, are 
of themselves unsurprising.
But if the members are behaving according to this ideal,
they will learn about the true state of the economy, and
Delayed doves
After a year on the MPC, external
members begin voting for
substantially lower interest rates
in brief...
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begin to figure out how to interpret the views of their
fellow members. If another member usually suggests
interest rates that are high, then you will still listen to their
views but interpret them in such a way as to factor in that
member's tendency to vote for higher rates.
As all members are doing this, over time the voting
behaviour of members should become more similar as
everyone learns what interpretations different members
will give to the same data. Therefore any differences in
voting behaviour that exist initially should disappear as
members adjust their views on monetary policy.
Furthermore, members who begin voting for similar
interest rates (and so must have the same interpretations
of the data) should not diverge from each other in 
the future.
But our analysis of the voting records in fact shows the
opposite pattern. External members initially vote in line
with internal members, but after about a year on the MPC,
these external appointments begin voting for substantially
lower interest rates. This delayed ‘dovishness’ is present
even when we take account of differences in members’
backgrounds, age and education, as well as the current
macroeconomic environment.
These results are especially striking considering that many
of the internal and external members have very similar
education and career experiences on appointment to the
MPC, and many of the internal members have had no prior
central bank experience until they joined the MPC and the
Bank staff.
Our research explores why external members may behave
in this way. We examine differences in the term lengths
that they will serve, the likelihood that they will be
reappointed and the possibility that external members try
to differentiate themselves so as to get publicity and boost
their career options on leaving the MPC. We cannot
conclude that any of these factors are important.
One possible explanation that remains is that external
members, on first joining the committee, do not fully
express their view about the correct interest rate. It is only
later, once they have gained experience, that they begin to
articulate their differing views. 
These results leave open a number of future research
questions. For example, why would external members,
appointed as experts, hide their views when they first join
the MPC? And are some of the internal members
continuing to hide their true views, keeping interest rates
higher than necessary so as to be seen as more hawkish? 
It may well be that the current structure of the MPC merits
reassessment in the light of this evidence of the changing
behaviour of external members.
This article summarises ‘Delayed Doves: MPC Voting
Behaviour of Externals’ by Stephen Hansen and 
Michael McMahon, CEP Discussion Paper No. 862
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0862.pdf).
Stephen Hansen is a doctoral student at LSE.
Michael McMahon is an occasional research assistant in
CEP’s macroeconomics programme.
External members
may not fully
express their views
on interest rates
when they first join
the committee
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N
ineteenth-century Britain
resembled a textbook
market economy in many
ways. Taxes and regulations
were low, and firms were able to respond
to the opportunities and threats that they
faced with very little ‘red tape’. One
aspect of that economic liberalism was
that if you owned land, you were able 
to build houses or factories pretty much
at will. Concepts such as the ‘green 
belt’ and planning permission had not yet
been invented. 
The result was a massive movement
of population over the course of the
nineteenth century, out of the countryside
and into the towns. This reflected the
‘agglomeration economies’ that cities
offered to manufacturing firms. Put
simply, productivity was higher in cities
than in the countryside, and therefore
firms chose to locate in cities. That
productivity in turn fed through to higher
wages, and while the streets
of London, Liverpool,
Manchester and so on were
not paved with gold, they
did offer more opportunities
than were available in smaller
towns and villages.
At the start of the nineteenth
century, Liverpool and Manchester each
had a population of around 100,000. At
the century’s end, they each had around
600,000. Towns such as Preston grew
tenfold, and Crewe, which was a hamlet
of 46 houses in 1800, was home to
42,000 people in 1900. And London grew
by a truly phenomenal five million people
over the century.
Not that all cities grew dramatically:
some, such as Bristol or Gloucester,
important places in 1800, were not
transformed by 1900: their share of the
British population did not grow.
The nineteenth century shows us that
The fast-growing cities of the Victorian age
made Britain the workshop of the world.
Tim Leunig argues that there are important
lessons for how we manage today’s economy,
notably the need to end the highly restrictive
planning laws that constrain housing
development in the South East and in cities
associated with our top universities.
Where to 
build Britain’s
new houses
Today’s 
British economy 
cannot respond
to new
opportunities 
in the way that 
it did in the
nineteenth
century
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location, as well as size, matters.
Lancashire was the home of the cotton
textile industry for good reasons: the
damp climate was well suited to cotton
spinning and weaving, and the raw
cotton was imported from America 
via Liverpool.
Once established there, agglomeration
economies meant that productivity was
higher not only because of the climate,
but because of the levels of local
knowledge. It would have been possible
to open a cotton mill in Suffolk, but the
costs of getting the raw material to
Suffolk, combined with lower productivity
away from the agglomeration economies,
meant that such a firm would have to pay
very low wages indeed to compete with
Lancashire mills. People in Suffolk
preferred to move to Lancashire and be
paid well, than to stay in Suffolk, do the
same job and be much less well paid. 
By 1945, for perfectly understandable
reasons, Britain’s faith in the market
economy was shaken. We had just won
the war with a state-planned and directed
economy. Furthermore, the free market
period between the two wars was seen as
a failure. Policy-makers looked to our own
wartime experience, which, combined
with the apparent success of Soviet Russia
and, to an extent, Germany prior to 
1939 gave them great confidence in the
ability of state planning to deliver a
successful economy.
The belief that ‘the man in Whitehall
really does know best’ took many forms.
One aspect was the rise of the planning
system, originating in the 1947 Town and
Country Planning Act. Today, green belts,
‘areas of outstanding natural beauty’,
‘sites of special scientific interest’ and so
on dramatically constrain the places
where development can take place.
Furthermore, even within land marked
for development, planning laws heavily
constrain what can be built. For example,
land zoned for industrial use cannot be
used for housing, and vice versa. The
economy cannot respond to new
opportunities in the way that it did in the
nineteenth century: the location of
Britain’s population has been ossified, and
in 2008 it bears a far greater similarity to
1945 than, say, the location of population
of 1908 did to that of 1845.
This would not matter if economic
opportunities could flow easily to the
areas in which people lived half a 
century or more ago. Sadly, the evidence
shows that this is not the case. Just as it
would not have been possible to move
parts of the Lancashire cotton industry
out of Lancashire a century ago, so 
it is not feasible to move finance to
Lancashire today. 
Agglomeration economies are
growing. Information technology allows
skilled white-collar ‘HQ’ service jobs to be
detached from their associated
manufacturing operations and located
near to other skilled HQ jobs, allowing
higher productivity driven by high skill
service sector ‘knowledge spillovers’. The
rise of dual career households means that
more couples want to work in places that
are large enough to offer two careers
rather than one career and one job.
Today, the South East is the best
location for business. It is obviously closer
to European markets, but better air links
make it closer to all parts of the world
than the North of England, Wales or
Scotland. And London has simply been
lucky: finance has prospered in the last
century; textiles have not.
The outcome is that wages in the
South East, and particularly in London, are
higher than those anywhere else in
Britain, reflecting higher levels of
productivity. In contrast, towns outside
the South East have lower wages and
higher unemployment. 
So we would expect to see the
The planning
system prevents
Oxford and
Cambridge
becoming the
twenty-first
century
equivalents of
Liverpool and
Manchester in
the nineteenth
century
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population of the South East
boom as the population of
the North West boomed a
century ago. But this has
not happened.
Two obvious places that
should generate massive
knowledge spillovers – Oxford and
Cambridge – have seen population grow
at just 0.5% per year. The planning system
prevents them from becoming the
Liverpool and Manchester of the twenty-
first century, cities that grow beyond
recognition within a generation, creating
well paid, interesting jobs in abundance. 
There is no doubt that Britain pays a
high price for these restrictions. Had they
been in place in 1850, Britain would not
have become the workshop of the world
and would have been markedly poorer.
The same is true today.
The people who lose out are not
primarily the well educated since they can
afford to migrate and frequently do so
after graduation. The people who lose out
are those who cannot move to the South
East because of housing costs: they end up
in less well paid jobs and are more likely to
be unemployed. 
The planners were well meaning, and
their confidence in planning over the
market economy is easy to understand
given the experience of 1939-45. They are
still well meaning, but it is harder to
understand ignoring market signals in
2008. 
The market is very clear: land for
housing and all other forms of
development is worth far more in the
South East than anywhere else in Britain.
Land for flats or maisonettes is worth four
times as much in Southwark as in Leeds,
four times as much in Camden as in
Manchester, and four times as much in
Hackney as in Birmingham.
Indeed, housing land in the lowest
cost part of London – Redbridge – is
worth more than equivalent land in
Manchester, which is the highest cost
place outside the South East. Only Oxford,
Cambridge and London’s commuter
towns come close to London’s values.
Land is worth more in London and the
South East because when people move to
these places, they get better jobs and can
afford to pay more for houses. Or to put
it another way, if we build more houses in
the South East, the jobs that emerge to
take advantage of these new workers are
better paid jobs than if we build them
anywhere else in Britain. 
For that reason, the government
should make clear that all significant
levels of new building will take place in
housing hotspots: London and its
commuter satellites as well as in high
value-added cities, which are generally
associated with top-notch universities.
Land prices tell us where to allow
development. If we follow those market
signals, not only will the individual
workers be better off but we will all be
better off since tax revenues will be
higher and benefit payments lower. 
Of course, some land is worth
preserving for its amenity value. But
studies show that people place little value
on relatively unattractive, industrialised
agriculture that makes up so much of the
green belt today. We have gone too far
and it is those who are trapped in areas
that are in decline, and will remain in
decline, who are paying the price. It is a
high price, and one that will increase, and
not decrease, over time.
Tim Leunig is a lecturer in economic
history at LSE and an associate in CEP’s
globalisation programme.
The government
should make
clear that all
significant levels
of new building
take place in
housing hotspots
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